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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The statutory provision that confers jurisdiction to this Court is Section 78A-
4-103(2)( e ), U.C.A. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the lower court err in failing to make sufficiently detailed findings to 
allow the Appellate court the opportunity to adequately review the trial court's 
vj decision? In determining a defendant's Motion to Withdraw a Guilty Plea, the 
Court needs to assess the credibility of the evidence and make detailed findings on 
all relevant facts. Rule 12 ( c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. These 
facts must be sufficiently detailed to allow the Appellate court the opportunity to 
adequately review the trial court's decision. State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882 
(Utah App. 1990). On Appeal, the trial court's denial of a Motion to Withdraw a 
Guilty Plea will not be disturbed "unless it clearly appears that the trial court 
abused its discretion." State v. Trujillo-Martinez, 814 P.2d 596, 599 (Utah App. 
1991 ). This lack of adequate findings was brought to the lower court's attention in 
~ a Motion for Clarification filed on May 11, 2015 (R. 3 52-53 ). 
2. Did the lower court err in failing to find prosecutorial misconduct when 
the undisputed facts reveal that the deputy district attorney informed Defendant 
and his counsel that the complainant had informed the deputy assistant attorney 
1 
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that she did not want the defendant to serve time in prison when, in fact, she 
adamantly denied such a statement and emphasized to Defendant's investigator 
that she always wished him to go to prison from the time of the commission of the 
offense. Did the lower court err in failing to set aside the guilty plea and 
reinstating the preliminary hearing that had been waived by Defendant on the basis 
of the representation by the deputy county attorney? A trial court's handling of 
claimed prosecutorial misconduct is reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard. State v. King, 248 P.3d 984 (Utah App. 2010); State v. Bragg, 317 P.3d 
452 (Utah App. 2013). This argument was brought to the Court's attention in 
Defendant's "Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea" filed 
April 11, 2015 (R. 306-319). 
3. Did the lower court err in failing to allow Defendant to withdraw his 
guilty plea under Section 77-13-6(2)(a), U.C.A. since the uncontroverted record 
shows that the plea was not knowingly or voluntarily made? The evidence is 
uncontroverted that the deputy county attorney represented to the defendant, his 
counsel, and to the court that the complaint had originally desired that Defendant 
not serve any time in the state penitentiary. Furthermore, he represented that her 
position had not changed and that the state would recommend no prison time 
unless the complaining witness did not agree. The uncontroverted evidence 
produced by Defendant showed that the complaining witness desired Defendant to 
2 
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go to prison at all times and that the claim made by the deputy county attorney was 
a misrepresentation of her position which induced the defendant to enter his plea of 
guilty. This Court reviews the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under 
~ an abuse of discretion standard, incorporating a clearly erroneous standard for 
findings of fact and reviewing questions of law for correctness. State v. Person, 
140 P.3d 584 (Utah App. 2006); State v. Walker, 308 P.3d 573 (Utah App. 2013). 
This issue was preserved in the Memorandum in Support of Motion to Withdraw 
Guilty Plea filed April 11, 2015 (R. 306-319). 
~ 
PERTINENT UTAH STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are relevant to this Appeal: Rule 11, Utah 
Rules Crim. Proc.; Rule 12, Utah Rules Crim. Proc.; Section 77-13-6(2)(a), 
U.C.A.; Amendment 5 to the U.S. Constitution. 
ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
While there were many procedural events occurring in this litigation, very 
few are relevant to this Appeal and are as follows: 
On April 18, 2013 an Information was filed against the defendant by Deputy 
District Attorney Thaddeus May alleging that Defendant engaged in sexual 
intercourse with another person without the complainant's consent in violation of 
Section 76-5-402, U.C.A., a first degree felony. (R.1-3). 
3 
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On June 6, 2013 the preliminary hearing was set before the Honorable 
Robert Faust. Defendant waived the preliminary hearing. (R. 41 ). 
Over the course of the next eighteen months Defendant's attorneys filed 
various motions and requests including a request to tum over all DNA and clothing ~ 
for independent examination, a motion to suppress some of the statements made by 
Defendant to the arresting officer on the basis that the defendant had not been 
properly Mirandized, and a motion to reopen the preliminary hearing to allow the 
testimony of two previously unknown witnesses. All of these motions and 
hearings were scheduled to be heard on January 5, 2015. (R. 144). 
On January 5, 2015 at the hearing scheduled for the various motions, a plea 
bargain was reached between Defendant and Deputy District Attorney Thaddeus 
May. Mr. May agreed to reduce the offense from a first-degree felony to a second-
degree felony. In addition, the plea bargain agreement states: "In exchange for the 
defendant's plea of guilty the prosecutor agrees that in the event the complainant 
does not affirmatively insist upon the prosecution seeking a prison commitment 
that the prosecutor will recommend probation and no prison." (R. 150). 
The prosecutor made various statements to the court concerning the plea 
agreement that will be extensively discussed infra. The "Minutes Change of Plea 
Notice" dated January 5, 2015 states the following: 
Counsel represents to the Court that a resolution has been reached. 
The State agrees that they will not recommend a prison sentence if the 
4 
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complainant is not requesting prison. The State also represents to the Court 
that the complainant is aware of the resolution and in agreement. (R. 154). 
The Judge signed the Minute Entry. (R. 155). 
On January 5, 2015 Deputy District Attorney Thaddeus May filed an 
"Amended Information" recharging Defendant with the violation of 76-5-404 
U.C.A., a second degree felony. (R. 158-59). 
On February 25, 2015 App sent its recommendations to the court concerning 
the recommended sentence of Defendant. The report stated, "It is respectfully 
VJP recommended by Adult Probation and Parole, Court Services Unit, that Defendant 
be committed to the Utah State Prison for the term as prescribed by law." (R. 162). 
The report further states: 
Complainant M.C. is affirmatively recommending the Defendant be 
sentenced to prison for a minimum of two years, as she herself has had to 
deal with the consequences of the defendant's actions for the past three 
years, and quite possibly for the rest of her life. She feels the defendant 
should have to similarly be held accountable and suffer from the 
consequences of his own actions, as she has had to do for the past three 
years." 
(R. 164). 
In view of the unexpected nature of the App report, defense counsel 
requested a continuation for the sentencing hearing. (R. 198-202). On March 2, 
2015 a hearing was held before the district court. This was the date originally 
~ scheduled for sentencing. The Court granted the defense Motion for Continuance 
to March 30, 2015 based upon the prior motion filed by defendant. The Minutes 
5 
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state, "the complainant in this matter can address the court today and will not have 
to Appear at the next hearing." (R. 228-29). The complainant gave a short 
statement to the court requesting that the defendant be sent to prison. A portion of 
her statement was as follows: 
As far as what I believe should be done to you, I'm asking the judge 
to sentence you to two-a-half years in prison, the same sentence you've dealt 
me. A prison I've been in, waiting for this to be over. I also want you to be 
on the sexual offender list. (Tr. March 2, 2015, p. 12). 
On March 19, 2015 the state filed a "Substitution of Counsel of Record for 
the State" replacing Deputy District Attorney Thaddeus May with Aaron W. Flater. ~ 
(R. 230). 
On March 26, 2015 Defendant filed a "Motion for Leave to Withdraw Guilty 
Plea and Stay Sentencing Proceedings." The defendant requested thirty days to 
prepare and file a memorandum of law relating to the statement of the alleged 
complainant requesting a prison sentence in complete contradiction to the prior 
statements of the deputy district attorney. (R. 233-35). 
On March 30, 2015 a hearing was held before the trial court and with the 
new prosecutor Aaron Flater. Under the State's objection, the court allowed the 
defendant to file a Memorandum in Support of the Motion by April I 0th, the State 
to file a response by April 241\ and the matter to be set for oral argument on April 
2?1h. (R. 239). 
6 
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On April 8, 2015 attorney Craig S. Cook entered his Appearance as co-
counsel on behalf of defendant Robert Magness. (R. 241 ). 
On April 10, 2015 the Affidavit of Larry Long (R. 244-55), the Affidavit of 
Shawn Kane, (R. 256-67) and the Affidavit of Robert Morgan Magness (R. 268-
73) were filed with the court. In addition, a Memorandum in Support of the 
Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Plea was filed (R. 306-19) together with a Motion 
to Withdraw Guilty Plea. (R. 323). 
A hearing was held on April 27, 2015 on Defendant's Motion to Withdraw 
Guilty Plea. The state did not file its opposition memorandum until April 27, 
2015, the day of the hearing (R. 334-35) rather than the date set by the judge of 
April 24th • 
At the hearing, counsel for the defendant argued that the guilty plea should 
be set aside on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct and involuntary entry of the 
guilty plea. The deputy district attorney rejected these contentions and argued that 
the guilty plea should stand. The court took the matter under advisement and, 
depending on the decision, set sentencing or scheduling for a new trial for May 11, 
2015. (R. 336-38). 
On May 6, 2015 the lower court issued its "Ruling and Order." The court 
ruled that there was no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct in that "there is no 
evidence that these representations were contrary to what the prosecutor knew to 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
be true." In addition, the court ruled that Defendant did not meet his burden under 
Section 77-13-6(2)(A) to withdraw his guilty plea. Accordingly, the court denied 
Defendant's Amended Motion for Leave to Withdraw Guilty Plea, Reinstate 
Preliminary Hearing and Reinstate All Prior Filed Motions. The court set 
sentencing for May 11, 2015. (R. 339-42). 
On May 11, 2015 Defendant filed his "Motion to Clarify the Ruling and 
Order of Defendant's Motions to Withdraw Guilty Plea, Reinstate Preliminary 
Hearing, and Reinstate All Prior Filed Motions and Requests." Defendant argued 
that the court failed to meet its obligation in making specific findings of fact as 
required by the Appellate courts. (R. 348-51 ). 
On May 11, 2015 Defendant was sentenced by the lower court to an 
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. (R. 356-57). 
On May 17, 2015 the Notice of Appeal was filed. (R. 358-59). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The prior section lists the chronology of events that occurred in this matter 
which are contained in the record of the District Court. However, the factual basis 
for this Appeal is only partially contained in one transcript before the lower court 
during the time of the entry of the guilty plea. All other relevant facts are 
contained solely in the affidavits of attorney Larry Long (R. 244-55), defendant 
8 
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Robert Morgan Magness (R. 268-74)), Shawn Kane and the transcription of a 
telephone conversation between investigator Shawn Kane and M.C., the 
complainant of the case. (R. 256-267) This last affidavit and transcript is contained 
14) in the Appendix to this Brief. 
THE STATE DID NOT PROVIDE ANY CONTRADICTORY 
AFFIDAVITS, TRANSCRIPTS, OR LIVE TESTIMONY IN OPPOSITION TO 
THESE AFFIDAVITS AND TELEPHONE TRANSCRIPT. Thus, for the purpose 
of this Appeal, it must be assumed that the factual events and conversations that 
occurred in these affidavits and telephone transcript are true and correct and must 
be dealt with as such when reviewing the legal arguments made in this matter. 
The first significant event relating to this Appeal occurred on June 6, 2013-
the date and time set for the preliminary hearing. Larry Long testified in his 
~ affidavit that he had determined that there was a legitimate defense as to whether 
the complainant had consented to sexual intercourse or whether defendant believed 
she had consented in light of their impaired and intoxicated conditions at the time 
the officers arrived at the residence. (Long Affidavit, ,I 6,7)(R. 245). 
Long further testified that it was his intention at the preliminary hearing to 
thoroughly probe the complainant as to her memory and to her consumption of 
alcohol during the evening and to cross examine her as to her sexual relations with 
defendant's son prior to his going to work that morning. Long also stated he 
9 
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intended to question the complainant's girlfriend as to her recollection of all events 
and the state of mind of the complainant during the time line that the rape allegedly 
occurred. (Long Affidavit, 1 8)(R. 246). 
Mr. Long stated that on the date of the preliminary hearing he observed 
Thad May, the deputy district attorney assigned to the case, consulting with the 
plaintiff and a female companion. "Mr. May then left the two females and 
approached me to discuss the case. He specifically told me that the complainant 
informed him that she did not want the defendant to go to prison." (Long 
Affidavit, 119, 1 O)(R. 246). 
Mr. Long then related that based upon his lengthy legal experience, this was 
a significant event because when an alleged complainant does not request prison 
time, the prosecuting attorney, the AP&P and the court look much more favorably 
to a reduced punishment or parole. (Long Affidavit, 1111, 12)(R. 246-47). 
Mr. Long then stated in his affidavit: 
Upon hearing this revelation that the complainant did not seek a 
prison term against defendant, I completely abandoned my desire for a 
preliminary hearing. My experience has taught me that if a complainant is 
favorable to my client, then it is very harmful for me to put that witness on 
the stand and cross examine her as to very personal and sensitive issues. 
Such cross-examination will almost certainly result in hostility toward the 
defendant that will again result in greater punishment. (Long Affidavit, 1 
14 )(R. 24 7). 
Long testified that he discussed this new information with his client and 
advised him that the preliminary hearing should be waived. The defendant agreed 
10 
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and Mr. Long informed the court that they would waive the preliminary hearing in 
the matter. (Long Affidavit ,I l S)(R. 248). 
The Affidavit of Robert Morgan Magness substantiates Mr. Long's 
"" statements. Mr. Magness stated that upon the day of the preliminary hearing he 
was told by Mr. Long that it would be necessary to thoroughly cross examine the 
complainant and her girlfriend as to all facts and circumstances that night including 
their alcohol consumption and sexual acts. (Magness Affidavit, ,I S)(R. 269). 
Defendant Magness stated in his Affidavit: 
While waiting in the vestibule I witnessed Mr. Thad May, the deputy 
district attorney, consulting with the complainant and her girlfriend. He then 
joined me and Mr. Long. Mr. May informed us that the complainant did not 
want me to go to prison. He said that it may now be possible to enter into a 
plea bargain where I might not go to prison. I was very happy to hear this 
news. Mr. Long then stated that he advised me that we should waive the 
preliminary hearing because to proceed would greatly alienate the 
complainant and may make her hostile or antagonistic toward me when she 
was asked questions about drinking and sex. I agreed that we should waive 
the preliminary hearing because of this new information. (Magness 
Affidavit, ,I 6)(R. 289-90). 
Private investigator Shawn Kane was hired by the defendant to assist in the 
defense of this matter. As such, he contacted the complainant on January 10, 2014 
regarding solely what had occurred on the night of the incident. (Shawn Kane 
Affidavit, ,I,I 3, 4, 5)(R. 257). Mr. Kane then related the following concerning the 
preliminary hearing that she attended: 
She informed me that in her mind the defendant had already entered a 
guilty plea based upon her conversations with the prosecutor at the hearing 
11 
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she last attended. She stated that the prosecutor told her that she would not 
need to testify unless she wanted to go to the defendant's sentencing hearing 
to say something about how he should be punished. (Shawn Kane Affidavit, 
16)(R. 258). 
On March 1, 2015 Mr. Kane again contacted the complainant at the same 
phone number previously used. He recorded the conversation and attached a 
transcript that he certified to be accurate as to their conversation. (Kane Affidavit, 
1 9)(R. 258). This transcript is attached as an Addendum to this Brief. 





And there was a question, Jennifer Murray [App agent] 
asked you a question, and then the attorney had a 
question. I say, "the attorney" sorry, Larry Long had a 
question about prison. And so, initially, and I explained 
the kind of question that then-initially, when this whole 
thing started and you had spoken with the district 
attorney and the prosecutor-that would be Thad May-
at a hearing they believe you said that you did not want 
Robert to go to prison. 
No, I didn't say that. 
Okay. 
I didn't say that I did not want him to go to prison. I 
said, well it's important to me that he's on the sexual 
offender list. That was like-I said that I wanted him to 
serve prison time, but the most important thing to me was 
that I wanted him to go on the sexual offender list. ~ 
(March 1 Tr. pp. 4-5)(R. 263-64 ). 
Mr. Kane continued the interview with the following question: 
MR.KANE: At, at the time, did you want, when you talked to him, 
did you want him to go to prison too? 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 







Yes, I felt like he deserved some time in prison. 
Okay. All right. And that-I just wanted to double 
check, because there was some confusion from the 
attorney's side, and not your attorneys but Larry Long 
and the paperwork that came in, in making sure that he 
had the correct information, that when you talked to Thad 
May-
Yeah 
Did you say you wanted Robert to go to prison? And 
then, when you talked to Jennifer Murray did you also 
tell her you wanted him to go to prison too? 
Yes-I said essentially the same thing to her. Id. at p. 
After the preliminary hearing, no immediate offer for a plea bargain was 
made by Mr. May. The defense team continued to file various motions in 
preparation of the trial. (Long Affidavit, ,I 1 7)(R. 248). 
Mr. Long verified the hiring of Shawn Kane to assist them in preparation of 
the defense. He also verified the conversation of January 10, 2014 that Mr. Kane 
had with the complainant including her belief that the defendant had already plead 
guilty based on her conversation with Thad May during the preliminary hearing. 
i.::P Finally, "he reported to me that the plaintiff expressed no anger or vindictiveness 
against defendant in her conversation but did not mention, one way or the other, 
what punishment he should receive." (Larry Long Affidavit, ,I l 8)(R. 248-49). 
13 
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During the remainder of 2014 the defense team filed various motions and 
requests for discovery that were all opposed by the state. (Larry Long Affidavit, 11 
21-23)(R. 250). Mr. Long stated, "During this period of time it was the intent of 
myself and Mr. Parsons [ co-counsel] to continue to provide a vigorous defense in 
preparation of a trial should the need occur. However, based upon the 
representation of Mr. May as to the attitude of the complainant, we were hopeful 
that a settlement could be reached. (Larry Long Affidavit, ,r 24 )(R. 250). 
On January 5, 2015 a hearing was scheduled as to all the prior motions filed 
by the defense team. Defendant's attorneys were prepared to argue all the various 
matters to protect the constitutional rights of their client. However, Mr. May 
Approached Mr. Long and Mr. Parsons and proposed that a plea agreement be 
reached in which the first degree felony would be reduced to a second degree 
felony-forcible sexual abuse-and that the prosecutor would recommend no 
prison sentence be served by the defendant provided that the complainant did not 
affirmatively insist upon the prosecution seeking a prison commitment. (Larry 
Long Affidavit, ,r 26)(250-51 ). 
Mr. Long stated in his affidavit the reason why this offer seemed beneficial 
to his client: 
At this time I realized that we were giving up all the previous defenses 
and discovery requests that had been made during the last year but felt that 
the plea bargain was in the best interest of my client especially believing that 
the complainant would not seek a prison term against my client thereby 
14 
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resulting in a favorable recommendation by the prosecutor and App to this 
Court at the time of sentencing. Because probation with jail time was an 
option to a second degree offense but not a first degree offense, I felt there 
would be a good chance for my client to avoid a five year or so prison 
sentence under either a first or second. (Larry Long Affidavit, ,r 28)(R. 
251). 
At the hearing the defendant executed the "Statement of Defendant in 
Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel" referred to in the prior section 
of this Brief. The bottom of page 4 of the statement reads as follows: 
All the promises, duties and provisions of the plea agreement, if any, 
are fully contained in this statement, including those explained below: in 
exchange for the defendant's plea of guilty the prosecution agrees that in the 
event the victim does not affirmatively insist upon the prosecutor seeking a 
prison commitment that the prosecutor will recommend probation and no 
prison. (R. 150). 




All right, and is this done with the alleged victim's-
Correct. She's been contacted twice by the state since 
the offers, since we've discussed resolving the case, she's 
made no response to my attempts to get response, her 
phone did not work. When we met initially during the 
intake, her very first impression of the case was, actually, 
she was not seeking prison at the time and was fairly 
amenable to resolving the case. And I had 
(unintelligible) prior. Since that time, she has not 
communicated with the state at all although we made 
multiple attempts to contact her. 
MR. PARSONS: And I think the factual statement will clarify that to some 
degree, Your Honor, I would represent that-
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MR.MAY: Her wishes are not being cut out of this resolution 
MR. PARSONS: I would represent that the victim and the perpetrator in 
this case were so drunk that neither of them knew what 
was going on in the context. (pp. 4-5, Tr. of Jan. 5, 
2015). 
At the end of the proceeding, the following statements were made: 
MR. PARSONS: As it is anticipated, Your Honor, that in exchange for this 
guilty plea, that is Mr.-the prosecution has heretofore 
indicated to the Court that unless the victim affirmatively 
requests a commitment of prison for the defendant's 
behavior, that the prosecutor in prosecution in this matter 
will recommend no prison time and will recommend 
probation of some form. 
MR. MAY: That's correct Your Honor. Our recommendation is 
simply that we would honor the victim's wishes. If the 
victim were asking for a prison sentence, we're not 
bound to not recommend prison and the victim is not 
seeking a prison sentence. That's not her request. That 
recommendation, however, does not bind the state in any 
way as to jail, that would be speaking in any event 
regardless of the recommendation. (Id. at pp. 10-11 ). 
In the Minute Entry signed by the Court the following language is contained. 
"Counsel represents to the Court that a resolution has been reached. The State 
agrees that they will not recommend a prison sentence if the victim is not 
requesting prison. The State also represents to the Court that the victim is aware of ~ 
the resolution and in agreement." (R. 154 ). 
Defendant Robert Morgan Magness recited his memory of the events of 
January 5, 2015 in his affidavit. He stated: 
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While waiting for the court to start, I witnessed Mr. Long, Mr. 
Parsons, and Mr. May conferring for quite a long time. Mr. Long and Mr. 
Parsons then came to me and informed me that Mr. May had agreed to 
reduce the charge to forcible sexual abuse which was a second degree felony 
and not a first. They also said it would be likely I would not face any prison 
time because Mr. May had expressly confirmed with Mr. Long and Mr. 
Parsons that the complainant in this case did not want me to go to prison. I 
figured she knew that both of us shouldn't have been so drunk that morning 
and that it was an unfortunate incident that should be forgiven if I spent 
some time in jail. (Robert Magness Affidavit, ,I 8)(R. 270-71 ). 
Mr. Magness then continues as to the recommendation of his attorneys: 
They told me that the prosecuting attorney would recommend that I 
not go to prison unless the complainant insisted I go to prison. However, my 
attorneys thought it was very improbable that this would hAppen in light of 
Mr. May's strong assurance that she did not want me to serve time in prison. 
I was also told by Mr. Long and Mr. Parsons that I would be giving up all of 
my constitutional rights to contest this charge against me. They believed, 
however, that there was a very good likelihood that while I may have to 
serve time in the county jail, I would not have to serve time in the State 
Prison based upon the circumstances of the night, my prior favorable record, 
and the positive attitude of the complainant. I agreed that I would waive my 
right to a trial and plead guilty. (Robert Magness Affidavit, 19)(R. 271 ). 
Finally Defendant stated: 
During the hearing with the court I again heard Mr. May state that the 
complainant did not want a prison term for me even though he had been 
unable to contact her for several months. Based upon his statement I felt 
very good about my decision to enter into a guilty plea in this case. (Robert 
Magness Affidavit, ,I l0)(R. 271-272). 
The remaining relevant facts are undisputed. The subsequent App report 
recommended a term of prison incarceration that included a statement of the 
complainant that she wished defendant to go to prison for at least two to three 
years to compensate for the time that she had suffered. On March 2, 2015 the 
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complainant made a similar statement in open court as to her feelings and 
recommendations as to defendant's sentence. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The defendant produced the only evidence relating to the complainant's 
state of mind as to whether or not she desired the defendant to be incarcerated in 
prison and the time period of her desire. The state offered no proof whatsoever 
except as to the statements made by the deputy district attorney in the guilty plea 
proceeding. The court made only several brief factual references in its opinion. 
The unrefuted evidence of the defendant, however, directly contradicts these 
references. Thus, the court failed to make the necessary findings required by this 
Court to resolve a factual dispute in a motion hearing. The matter should be 
remanded for further findings or, in the alternative, for a full evidentiary hearing as 
to circumstances relating to the representation by the deputy district attorney that 
the complainant did not wish defendant to be incarcerated in the state prison. 
2. Prosecutors are not equivalent to the average advocate for a litigant. 
Instead, they represent the state and the people of that state and must seek justice 
over victory. In this case, the uncontroverted evidence shows that the deputy 
district attorney misrepresented the state of mind of the complainant at two critical 
times in this prosecution. First, at the very moment when Defendant was preparing 
to cross-examine the complainant and her girlfriend as to the facts and 
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circumstances occurring on the morning of the incident. The prosecutor's 
misrepresentation resulted in an informed decision by defense counsel to waive the 
preliminary hearing and the possibility of impeaching the complaining witness or 
~ gathering critical information for trial. 
Secondly, at the time when various motions seeking discovery and other 
relief were to be heard, the deputy district attorney suddenly made an offer to 
reduce the charges and to agree not to recommend prison if the complainant 
agreed. This offer stopped all of the proceedings and all of the various defenses 
that were to be argued and, at the same time, eliminated the burden of a jury trial. 
This prosecutorial misconduct, therefore, goes beyond the mere setting aside 
of a guilty plea but requires the resetting of the entire defense including the 
preliminary hearing and all other matters that would have occurred but for this 
~ material misrepresentation. 
3. Utah law is very specific as to when a guilty plea can be withdrawn. The 
lower court refused to recognize the conflict in testimony as to the state of mind of 
the complaining witness contained in the telephonic transcript. The court found no 
conflict with the statement made by the deputy district attorney in open court and 
therefore refused to deal with any claim pursuant to the statute. The lower court 
erred in its decision since the representation of the complainant's state of mind in 
conjunction with the recommendation by the prosecutor for no prison time was, 
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according to the uncontroverted affidavits of the defense counsel, the only reason 
that the plea agreement was accepted. Since the agreement was made on a 
misrepresentation and a promise that was essentially illusionary, the plea should be 
vacated in accordance with Utah law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE 
SUFFICIENT FINDINGS OF FACT TO ADDRESS THE 
UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE PROFFERED BY DEFENDANT 
The factual basis underlying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Guilty 
Plea is contained entirely in the affidavits of Mr. Long, defendant Magness, Mr. 
Kane, and the telephone transcript of the conversation with the complainant. Aside 
from the brief statements made to the court on January 5, 2015, there is no other 
evidence to be considered. 
A review of the court's decision of May 6, 2015, however, makes no attempt 
to address these undisputed factual statements. It is clear from reading the 
transcript of the telephone conversation with the complainant that she, at no time, 
ever informed the deputy district attorney that she did not want Defendant to go to 
prison. Her desires were consistent throughout the entire case from the time she 
spoke to the App agent, her telephone conversation with Mr. Kane, and her 
statements to the court. Nonetheless, the court stated, "Nor has the prosecutor 
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intentionally made knowing use of false evidence by misrepresenting the nature of 
the victim's wishes. Rather, the prosecutor represented that, at the time he spoke 
with the victim, she was not seeking prison time. There is no evidence that these 
~ representations were contrary to what the prosecutor knew to be true." (Ruling and 
Order, p. 2)(R. 340). 
To the contrary, the telephone conversation with the complainant clearly 
indicates that since the incident occurred complainant always desired a prison 
incarceration for the defendant. The failure of the lower court to resolve this 
conflict of testimony requires a remand or an evidentiary hearing. 
This Court in State v. Humphrey, 79 P.3d 960 (Utah App. 2003) held that 
once a defendant shows good cause by putting forth evidence that the plea was in 
fact involuntary, the court needs to assess the credibility of the evidence and make 
v, detailed findings on all relevant facts pursuant to Rule 12 ( c) of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. Furthermore, the trial court's findings must be sufficiently 
detailed to allow the Appellate court the opportunity to adequately review the trial 
court's decision. See, State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah App. 1990). 
In the instant case, Defendant presented undisputed evidence as to what Mr. 
May had told the defense team and the defendant concerning the state of mind of 
the complainant. But more importantly, the complainant herself completely 
contradicted the statements made by Mr. May to the trial court during the guilty 
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plea proceeding. Either the court should have resolved the obvious conflict 
between these two sources of information or should have required an evidentiary 
hearing in which the complainant could testify in court as to the exact 
circumstances surrounding her interaction with Mr. May. 
The prior case of this court requires a remand for additional findings or for 
an evidentiary hearing to resolve the conflict. 
POINT II 
THE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT OF THE DEPUTY 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY IN MISREPRESENTING THE 
DESIRES OF THE COMPLAINANT VIOLATED 
DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AND CAUSED 
HIM TO FOREGO HIS RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Utah v. Hay, 859 P.2d 1 (Utah 1993) enunciated 
the duty of a prosecutor to provide information to the defense. The Court stated: 
The prosecution's responsibility is that of a "minister of justice and 
not simply that of an advocate" which includes a duty "to see that the 
defendant is accorded procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the 
basis of sufficient evidence." A criminal trial is more than a contest between 
the prosecution and the defense; it is a search for the truth. 
In Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935) Justice Sutherland explained 
prosecutorial misconduct to mean "overstepping the bounds of that propriety and 
fairness which should characterize the conduct of such an officer in the prosecution 
of a criminal offense." The prosecution's affirmative duty to disclose evidence 
22 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
favorable to a defendant can trace its origins to early 20th century strictures against 
misrepresentation by prosecutors. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432 (1995). 
In the instant case, the Deputy District Attorney Mr. May either intentionally 
lJP misrepresented the desires of the complainant as to punishment for the defendant 
or was grossly negligent in failing to ascertain her real feelings. This 
misrepresentation caused the defendant to waive his right to a preliminary hearing 
because he did not want to alienate what seemed to be a forgiving complainant. As 
such, therefore, he gave up his constitutional right to cross-examine the 
complainant and to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in the preliminary 
hearing. 
"The prosecutor has a special duty not to mislead; the government should, of 
course, never make affirmative statements contrary to what it knows to be the 
~ truth." United States v. Universita, 298 F .2d 365 (2d Cir. 1961 ). The government 
cannot properly, either explicitly or implicitly mischaracterize information that it 
has. A prosecutor cannot make knowing use of false evidence by misrepresenting 
the nature of non-testimonial evidence. Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967). 
The continued misrepresentation of the desires of the complainant induced 
Defendant to later give up his right to a jury trial and to enter a plea based on the 
false assumption that the complainant would be favorable to him by not seeking a 
prison term. This positive attitude would be reflected in the App report, the 
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recommendation of the prosecutor, and any testimony before the sentencing court. 
"When specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights are involved, the Supreme Court 
has taken special care to assure that prosecutorial conduct in no way impermissibly 
infringes upon them. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974). 
It is well settled that the "Brady Doctrine" provides that suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process 
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). The prosecution's violation of Brady can render a 
defendant's guilty plea involuntary. United States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 491,496 
(10th Cir. 1994 ). "In the context of an attack on the validity of a plea, evidence is 
considered material where there is a reasonable probability but for the failure to 
produce such information the defendant would not have entered the plea but 
instead would have insisted on going to trial." United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 
249 (2d Cir. 1998). This same principle is Applicable here. 
In the instant case the prosecutor made several representations to induce the 
defendant to give up his right to a jury trial. First, the chargeable offense was 
reduced from a first degree offense to a second degree offense; second, the 
prosecutor agreed to recommend no prison time provided the complainant did not 
"affirmatively insist on the prosecution seeking a prison commitment"; third, the 
prosecutor affirmatively stated that the complainant did not desire Defendant to 
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serve a prison sentence and that her wishes were in compliance with the plea 
agreement. 
As stated in the filed Affidavits, this plea agreement was acceptable because, 
v; by reducing the offense from a first to a second degree, it gave the defendant the 
opportunity to eliminate any prison sentence. However, this could only occur if 
the complainant was cooperative and did not demand prison incarceration pursuant 
to the victim rights statutes. The defense attorneys knew that if this occurred, the 
defendant would have a high probability of probation (with county jail time 
required) because a non-vindictive complainant would significantly influence the 
App report, the recommendation of the prosecutor, and the sentencing court. 
As evidenced by the Affidavits, if the prosecutor merely offered to reduce 
the charge from a first to a second, the defense team would not have accepted it. 
~ While the range of years is certainly much greater for a first than a second, the 
estimated time used by the Board of Pardons for this particular offense would be 
Approximately the same under either charge. It was only the inducement of 
knowing that the complainant did not seek prison time that caused the defendant to 
give up his constitutional rights including a trial by jury. 
The lower court in one paragraph rejected Defendant's claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct with the following statement: 
Based on the record, the court cannot conclude that the prosecutor 
made "affirmative statements contrary to what it knows to be the truth." 
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United States v. Universita, 298 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1961). Nor has the 
prosecutor intentionally made knowing use of false evidence by 
misrepresenting the nature of the victim's wishes. Rather, the prosecutor 
represented that, at the time he spoke with the victim, she was not seeking 
prison time. There is no evidence that these representations were contrary to 
what the prosecutor knew to be true. (Ruling and Order, p. 2)(R. 
340)( emphasis added). 
The court obviously did not consider the telephone interview of the 
complainant in which she clearly stated at least three times that she always wanted 
the defendant to go to the state prison. Thus, it is hard to understand how the lower 
court concluded that there was "no evidence" that the representations adamantly 
made by the prosecutor were not "contrary to what the prosecutor knew to be true." 
It is also difficult to imagine how the prosecutor could have misinterpreted 
the very vindictive attitude of the complainant on the day of the preliminary 
hearing. Perhaps it is a mere coincidence, that his very upbeat assessment of the 
complainant's attitude eliminated the defense from the preliminary hearing and the ~ 
cross examination of the complainant and her girlfriend. The state produced no 
evidence relating to the testimony of Deputy District Attorney Thaddeus May or 
anyone else, for that matter, as to the circumstances of the preliminary hearing 
interaction with the complainant and with the defense and defendant. The lower 
court failed to address the issue of the preliminary hearing as to the prosecutorial 
misconduct and only addressed the guilty plea. 
26 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
However, the misstatement or misrepresentation by the prosecutor 
eliminated a valuable and constitutional right to confront defendant's accusers 
completely apart and aside from his inducement to enter a guilty plea. Assuming 
~ that the complaining witness was truthful in her statement to Mr. Kane, and 
assuming that all of the decision making stated in the affidavits of Mr. Long and 
the defendant occurred because of the prosecutor's misrepresentation, then it is 
clear as a matter of law that this conduct directly caused the defendant to waive his 
right to a preliminary hearing. 
The prosecutorial misconduct by the prosecutor in misrepresenting and 
misleading the defendant deprived him of due process. Therefore, under 
constitutional law defendant is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea, for a 
reinstatement of the preliminary hearing, and a reinstatement of all the motions and 
~ other matters that were pending prior to the entry of the guilty plea. This ruling 
will allow the defendant to be restored to his position and to allow him to prepare 
for trial by jury. Utah v. Gentry, 797 P.2d 456 ( 1990). 
POINT III 
ALTERNATIVELY, DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO WITHDRAW 
HIS GUILTY PLEA UNDER SECTION 77-l 3-6(2)(A) U.C.A. SINCE 
THE RECORD SHOWS THAT THE PLEA WAS NOT 
KNOWINGLY OR VOLUNTARILY MADE. 
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Section 77-13-6 U.C.A. states: "A plea of guilty or no contest may be 
withdrawn only upon leave of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly 
and voluntarily made." Defendant maintains that under the circumstances of this 
case his guilty plea was not "voluntary" under controlling case law. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988) 
extensively dealt with the "voluntariness of a plea." The Court cited a U.S. 
Supreme Court case that stated: 
A plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct 
consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to them 
by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by 
threat ( or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation, 
including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises, or perhaps by promises that 
are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the 
prosecutor's business (e.g. bribe). Brady v. United States, 397, 742 (1970). 
(Emphasis added). 
The Court then cited a federal Fourth Circuit case in which the defendant 
was told he could receive a prison sentence of 90 years--- when in fact the 
maximum sentence was 55 years. Defendant pleaded guilty so as to receive no 
more than a 25-year sentence. The 4th Circuit "held this misinformation vitiated 
the voluntariness of the plea because the benefit of the defendant's bargain had 
been grossly exaggerated. The defendant was therefore not aware of the true value ~ 
ofthe state's agreement." Hammond v. United States, 528 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1975), 
765 P.2d at 1278. 
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In Copeland, the defendant was promised by the prosecutor to be placed in a 
sex offender program at the Utah State Hospital rather than prison incarceration. 
Based upon that representation defendant pied guilty. However, the sentencing 
judge had no power at that time to commit him to the hospital rather than the 
prison. The Court concluded that the promise was illusory and permitted the 
defendant to withdraw his guilty plea. 
In State v. Norris, 57 P.3d 238 (Utah App. 2002) the trial court and the 
prosecutor promised the defendant that he could pursue a claim for vindictive 
prosecution on Appeal, but neither the court nor the prosecutor could fulfill that 
promise since the trial judge never entered a final order disposing of the 
defendant's vindictive prosecution claim and thus it could not be raised on Appeal. 
The Court of Appeals held that because the defendant's "pleas were not made 
Vii voluntarily with full knowledge of the consequences of pleading guilty, the 
defendant must be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea." 57 P.3d at 240. 
The lower court in its decision in the instant case cited the Copeland case 
and acknowledged that misrepresentations, unfulfilled, or unfulfillable promises, 
can make a plea involuntary. The court stated, however: 
Based on the record, the court cannot characterize the prosecutor's 
statements as misrepresentations, unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises. All 
the statements on the record made by the prosecution were some version of 
an explanation that the victim initially did not Appear to want the defendant 
to go to prison, but the prosecution's recommendation remained consistently 
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contingent on whatever the victim wanted. (Rule and Order, p. 2-
3 )( emphasis added). 
This statement, of course, like the prior factual statements of the court 
relating to prosecutorial misconduct, completely ignores the telephone transcript of 
the complainant in which she stated that she always believed the defendant should 
go to prison. 
Finally, the court noted that the defendant was aware that the court was not 
bound by the recommendations made by the prosecution and therefore, the plea 
was knowingly and voluntarily made. (Ruling and Order, p. 3)(R. 241 ). 
The negotiations in a plea bargain are a high stake's game of chance. 
For example, if a person goes into a casino and sees a roulette wheel with 95 black 
numbers and 5 red numbers, the person would feel quite confident on betting on 
black even though there was still a small chance that red may be the winning 
number. If the person bets on black and the wheel spins to red, the player can only 
lament his bad luck. However, this same person would be entitled to take back his 
bet if it was proven that the casino used trick lighting which completely distorted 
the colors: whereas the true odds were 95 red and 5 black. Thus, the mere 
possibility of an unfavorable result does not allow either a casino or a prosecutor to ~ 
distort the factors used in the decision making process. 
The initial misrepresentation caused Defendant to waive his right to a 
preliminary hearing that was critical to his defense. Later, in exchange for 
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Defendant waiving his right to trial by jury, the prosecutor agreed to reduce the 
charge by one degree. The handwritten statement under the category "Plea 
Agreement" added an additional incentive: "In exchange for the defendant's plea 
of guilty the prosecution agrees that in the event the victim does not affirmatively 
insist upon the prosecution seeking a prison commitment then the prosecution will 
recommend probation and no prison." 
At the time the plea agreement was entered into, the prosecutor had 
misrepresented that the complainant did not want Defendant to serve a prison 
sentence. It was therefore presumed by Defendant and his counsel that only in the 
unlikely event that complainant changed her mind, would the prosecution not 
recommend probation and no prison term. In fact, however, the condition was 
completely meaningless since the complainant at that very moment in time was 
insisting upon prison for the defendant. The plea agreement, therefore, was 
illusionary and while defendant and his counsel believed there was a high 
probability that the prosecutor would honor this promise, in fact, there was next to 
no probability based upon the complainant's strong desire to punish Defendant by 
prison incarceration at the instant the document was signed. 
In addition, the prosecutor's misrepresentation of the complainant's desires 
not only affected the recommendations of the prosecutor but would also affect the 
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AP&P report and the trial court when the complainant spoke so forcefully on 
March 2, 2015 demanding that Defendant be sent to prison. 
These repeated misrepresentations throughout the course of the prosecution 
created a false belief that probation was achievable if the defendant agreed to give 
up his right to a jury trial and plead guilty to the second-degree offense. Once 
again, this belief was also illusionary since the ship had already sailed, the bell had 
already rung, and the email had already been sent---dooming the probability of 
probation while at the same time eliminating Defendant's constitutional rights 
under our jury trial system. 
Of course, it is impossible to know what caused the deputy district attorney 
to so grossly misrepresent the attitude and state of mind of the complainant. In the 
most extreme case, it could be assumed that the deputy district attorney wanted to 
induce a plea bargain and avoid a trial by making a promise that would be very 
attractive to the defendant but which he knew would never be fulfilled. He would 
never have to make a recommendation against incarceration, knowing full well that 
the complainant would not agree to such a sentence. The range of possible reasons 
for this misrepresentation, therefore, goes from the extreme scenario just described 
to simple carelessness or negligence in confusing the complainant with someone 
else or simply forgetting what had previously occurred. In any event, however, 
regardless of the motivation or reasons for the conduct of the deputy district 
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attorney, the effect upon the defendant and his waiver of his right to trial was the 
same. 
The decision of the lower court must be reversed since the court failed to 
~ consider the direct contradiction between the statements made by the deputy 
district attorney in court and the statements of the complainant in the taped 
interview. The failure to recognize this conflict made the decision of the court 
fatally flawed since her legal conclusion was based upon erroneous facts. Because 
the state failed to meet its obligation to produce any counter evidence, this Court 
should assume the facts as stated by defendant are true and base its legal 
conclusions upon such finding which must necessarily allow for the vacation of the 
plea pursuant to Utah law. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons extensively outlined in the above arguments, Defendant 
requests that this Court reverse the decision of the lower court and allow him to 
vacate his guilty plea, conduct a preliminary hearing, and refile all prior motions 
and requests made prior to the entry of a guilty plea. 
DA TED this 26th day of October, 2015. 
M-kv 
Attorney for Appellant 
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FILED DISTRICT COUBT 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS, 
Defendant. 
RULING AND ORDER 
Case No. 131903746 
Judge Elizabeth A. Hruby-Mills 
Before the Court is Defendant's Amended Motion for Leave to Withdraw Guilty Plea, 
Reinstate Preliminary Hearing, and Reinstate All Prior Filed Motions and Requests ("Motion"). 
The Court has reviewed the moving, opposition, and reply papers. A hearing was held on April 
27, 2015. Having considered the briefing and arguments of counsel, the Court now rules as 
follows. 
On April 12, 2012, Defendant was charged with Rape, a first degree felony. On January 
5, 2015, Defendant entered a guilty plea to the charge of Forcible Sexual Abuse, a second degree 
felony. With the advice of counsel, Defendant signed a Statement of Defendant in Support of 
Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel ("Statement") confinning that his plea was voluntary. 
That Statement was also signed by his counsel confirming that the Defendant had read or was 
read and understood the contents of that Statement and that the confirmations by the Defendant 
in the Statement were true. The bottom of page four of the Statement reads as follows: 
All the promises, duties and provisions of the plea agreement, if any, are fully contained 
in this statement, including those explained below: In exchange for the Defendant's plea 
of guilty the prosecution agrees that in the event the victim does not affirmatively insist 
upon the prosecutor seeking a prison commitment that the prosecutor will recommend 
probation and no prison. 
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Before signing the Statement, the prosecution had represented to the Defendant that, as of 
the time of initial intake, the victim's impression was that she would not seek prison time. 
Defendant was aware that the prosecution had not communicated with the victim since getting 
her initial impression. At an evidentiary hearing on January 5, 2015, the prosecution explained 
that the State's "recommendation is simply that we would honor the victim's wishes." On March 
2, 2015, the victim appeared in court and, in part, made the following statement: 
As far as what I believe should be dealt to you, I'm asking the Judge to sentence you two-
and-a-half years in prison, the same sentence you've dealt me. A prison I've been in, 
waiting for this to be over. I also want you to be on the sexual offenders list. 
Defendant contends that the prosecution made a material misrepresentation when it stated 
that the victim did not want Defendant to go to prison. According to Defendant, this material 
misrepresentation, which allegedly induced Defendant to accept the guilty plea, amounted to 
prosecutorial misconduct which violated the Defendant's due process rights and caused him to 
forego his right to a jury trial. The Court disagrees. Based on the record, the Court cannot 
conclude that the prosecutor made "affirmative statements contrary to what it knows to be the 
truth." United States v. Universita, 298 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1961). Nor has the prosecutor 
intentionally made knowing use of false evidence by misrepresenting the nature of the victim's 
wishes. Rather, the prosecutor represented that, at the time he spoke with the victim, she was not 
seeking prison time. There is no evidence that these representations were contrary to what the 
prosecutor knew to be true. 
Next, Defendant contends that he is entitled to withdraw his guilty plea under Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-l 3-6(2)(A) because the plea was not knowing and voluntary. The Court respectfully 
disagrees. Contemplating voluntariness, the Utah Supreme Court recognized: 
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the 
actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own 
counsel, must stand unless induced by threats ( or promises to discontinue improper 
harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or 
perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to 
the prosecutor's business ( e.g. bribes). 
Slate v. Copeland, 765 P .2d 1266, 1274 (Utah I 988). Based on the record, the Court cannot 
characterize the prosecutor's statements as misrepresentations, unfulfilled, or unfulfillable 
promises. All of the statements on the record made by the prosecution were some version of an 
2 
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explanation that the victim initially did not appear to want the Defendant to go to prison, but the 
· prosecution's recommendation remained consistently contingent on whatever the victim wanted. 
Importantly, Counsel for the Defendant, after the Court found that the Defendant knowingly and 
voluntarily entered into the plea, further represented to the Court that his client knew that the 
Court was not bound by the recommendation made by the prosecution. 
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court has explained: 
In order to assist courts in determining whether a plea is knowingly and voluntarily made, 
we created rule 11. Rule 11 highlights important rights that defendants must understand 
in order for their pleas to be valid. By addressing those rights with the defendant in the 
plea hearing, district courts can test the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea and 
create a record of their inquiry. Indeed, where a district court complies with all the 
provisions of rule I 1, the court forecloses many potential arguments that the defendant's 
plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made. 
State v. Alexander, 2012 UT 27, ~ 24,279 P.3d 371,378. Here, there are no allegations that Rule 
11 was violated. The Court is satisfied that there was compliance with Rule and that Defendant 
knowingly and voluntarily entered into a guilty plea, particularly where "both the plea colloquy 
and the plea agreement, which was incorporated into the plea hearing record, clearly set forth the 
charges and the alleged conduct by (Defendant] that corresponded with the elements of the 
charges, in compliance with rule 11." State v. Candland, 2013 UT 55, ~ 18, 309 P.3d 230. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Amended Motion 
for Leave to Withdraw Guilty Plea, Reinstate Preliminary Hearing, and Reinstate All Prior Filed 
Motions and Requests is DENIED, consistent with the Court's Ruling above. The Court 
anticipates sentencing the Defendant at the date previously set, May 11, 2015. 
This Ruling and Order is the order of the Court, and no additional order is required to be 
prepared in this matter 
DATED this~ day of May, 2015. 
• •• ' ·., ... !... .. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
--·· ~--··--- ==== 





Case No. 131903 746 
ROBERT MORGAN MAGNESS~ Judge: ELIZABETH A. HRUBY-MILLS 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF. Olt\l ~?- s;-
Reing duly sworn under penalty of law, the declarant hereby declares and 
states the following: 
1 . I am over 18 years of age and can attest to the veracity of the 
statc1nents made herein. 
1 
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2. I am the owner of Kane Consulting, Inc. which is a licensed private 
investigation service Jocated in \Vest Bountiful, Utah. J am a 
mernber of the following organizations: ASIS~ PACSCO, 
lJACDL, NCISS, and PJAU. I vvas chairman of the DPS PI 
hearing and licensure board from 2008 to 2014. 
2. I wa~ retained by attorney Lan-y Long to assist him concerning the rape 
charges made against his client Robe11 Morgan i\llagness. 
3. On Friday~ January 10, 2014 l contacted the alleged victim by te]ephone 
using the phone number that was contained in the police and comt records. 
4. I explained that I ,vas an investigator for the defense and requested that 
she provide me infonnation as to what occmTed on the night of the charged crime. 
She gave me a detailed description of her version of the events including her 
emrloyment at the Good Spirits Bar that led to her meeting of Defendant, a regular ~ 
customer, as well as his son Shawn. She described how after her shift ended, she 
and her girlfriend together with Shawn and another male went to the residence of 
Defendant in order to drink and pa1iy. 
5. She described the events that night and the following moming when 
Defendant allegedly sexua11y assaulted her while she \Vas sleeping in the basement 
area. She further described her reaction and her interaction with the police on that 
morning. 
2 
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6. She inf01111ed me that in her mind the defendant had already entered a 
~ guilty plea based upon her conversations with the prosecutor at the hearing she last 
alt.ended. She stated that the prosecutor told her that she would not need to testify 
VP unless she wanted to go to the defendant's sentencing hearing to say something 
about how he should be punished. 
7. I advised her at several times in the conversation that she should contact 
the prosecutor to clarify the status of the case. 
8. l did not have any further contact with the alleged victim until March 1, 
2015. I was asked by attorney Lan-y Long to try to contact her, once again, in 
order to clarify the time frante as to when she first ]et it be known that she ,vanted 
the defendant 1~0 serve time in prison. I contacted her on the same phone number 
that I had previously used in my January 2014 call. 
9. I recorded the conversation \Vith the alleged victim so that a complete and 
accurate record could be made. I have reviewed the transcript dated March 26, 
~ 2015 of this telephone call and believe that it accurately reflects the conversation 
that I had with the alleged victim on TvJarch 1, 201 5. This transcript is attached to 
this affidavit. 
3 
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lJnder p<malty of perjury under the laws of the State of t.Hah, I, Shawn Kane 
hereby swear that the fr>regoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and 
under5tandi ng. 
.... 
-~ ---•-·~-----•--·•···-' •• - & ·- • 
-· Shawn Kane. 
~f-
SlJBSCRJBED AND SWORN to hefore me on this 10:~.'. day of ApriL 
.. 
' , 




; ! . 
, -~·- .· ~- :_..; 4l{~ ·. 
Notarv Public 
.·,.L£; _· __ • .. n--
.,, 
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1 
I~ THE THIRD .JlJDIClAL DISTRJCT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COlJ1'TY, STATE OF llTAH 
--------------------,-----------------
STATE OF CTAH~ 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT MORGAN ~1AGNESS, 
Defendant. 
CASE l\o. 131903746 
TRANSCRIPTTON OF MARCH 15T.2015 
TELEPl-lO\;E INTERVIEW 
.JLDGE: ELIZABETH A. HRUBY-f\-111.LS 
COl\·1ES NO\V, the Defendant and offers this transcription taken from the recording of a 
telephone interview between Shawn Kane. a private investigator, and .\1. C .. the victim in this 
case. which tr,ok place on March 1 '\ 2015. This Transcription ,vas prepared by Aaron A. 
Crabtree, law clerk for I .arry Long. 
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1 A P P E A R A N C E S 
2 SHA Vv'\J KANE 
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1 PROCEEDINGS 
vJ 2 rvtR. KAI\F: 
3 fv1el issa. can you hear me OK? 
4 :vf. C.: 
s Yeah, I can hear you. 
6 vrn. KA'.'JE: 
7 Ok. Thank you for c.:all ing me back. l appreciate it. Again-
8 f\1. C.: 
9 I was-
10 ~-1R. KANE: 
11 Oh. go ahead. 
12 M. C.: 
13 1 just wanted to clarify. ~o you are working on behalf of Robe11, right? 
14 \.1R. KANE: 
15 Correct. Sn, I'm a licensed private investigator here in the state of Ltah. I work-
16 M. C.: 
17 Wait, why would 1 want to talk to you? 
18 \1R. KANE: 
19 Oh, no, underst~ndab}e. ( work for attorney Larry Long. You and 1 actually spoke tvv·o years ago. 
~ 20 M. C.: 
21 Yes. I'm actually upset cJbt)Ut that because I ,,vas a little bit c.onfuscd a" to like who I \,vas talking 
22 with. 
23 MR. K/\KF: 
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Oh~ sorry, sorry. 1 try and explain up front: and sometimes people aren · t- don't completely 
2 understand, so. · cause again [ have to be transparent~ and so you don :t have to talk to me. I'm 
3 1101- you know~ l can:t force you to talk to me= anything like Lhat. You don't have to. I just- the 
4 attorney asked me to ask you a question about, you had talked to that adult probation & parole 
5 officer. 
6 \1. C.: 
7 Yes. 
8 :v1R. KANE: 
9 Hold that thought. I forgot her nan1e. Jennifer. 
10 ;\-1. C.: 
11 Yeah. 
12 MR. KM\F.: 
13 And there \:\!as n question. Jennifer Murray a~ked you a question~ and then the attorney had a 
14 question. [ say ~-the attorney/: sort)\ Larry Long hHd a question about prison. And so! initially~ 
15 and I'll explain kind of the question and then- initially~ when Lhis whole thing started and you 
16 had spoken with lhe district attorney and the prosecutor - that vvould he Thad May·- at a hearing 
17 they believe you said that you did not want Rohe1i to go to prison. 
• 
18 ivl. C.: 
19 1\·o. I didn't sa~: that. 
20 \1R. K/\~F: ~ 
21 Ok. 
22 i\l C.: 
(!; 
23 I didn't say tha1 I did not want him to go lo prison. I said, ~'Well. ifs more important to me thal 
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he~ s on the sexual offenders 1 isl.'' That was like- l said that I wanted him LO serve prison lime. 
2 but the most important thing to me was that [ wanted him to go on the sexmll offenders list. 
3 MR. KAKE: 
I.I Ok. So you- just to clarify. so J know. you do want him on the sexual offenders list. 
~ 
5 \11. C.: 
6 Yes. 
~ 7 ivfR. KANE: 
8 .'\ncL at the time. did you want, when you talked tn him~ did you want him to gn to prison loo? 
9 !'V1. C.: 
10 Yes. r felt like he deserved some time in prison. 
11 rvtR. KANE: 
12 Ok. i\lright. And that- I just wanted to double check, ·cause there was some confusion from the 
l3 attorneys• side. and not your attorneys but Larry Long and the paperwork that cmnc in, in 
14 making sure that he had the com:cl information, that when you talked to the- talked to Thad 
15 \fay-
16 M. C.: 
17 Yc.:ah. 
18 MR. KAKE: 
19 Did you say ynu \\:anted Robert lo go to prison? And then. when you talked to .Jennifer \4urphy. 
'...:P 20 did you also tell her you wanted him to go to prison too? 
21 ~t C.: 
22 Yes. I said the- I said essential)~ .. the same thing to her. 
7.3 1'vfR. KANE: 
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J Ok. Ok, and thal ·s al] l was trying lo clarify. I do appreciate you. you know~ at least talking to 
2 me and letting me kl1(HV on that. And so, that- that was just truly it. They wanted clarification on ~ 
3 that Just Io- ro double check and clarify if you wanted him lo go to prison and also be on the 
4 sexual offenders registry. 
5 M.C.: 
6 I'm planning on going there tomorrow. and maybe y<.Hl could help me with a question. Docs it 
7 stru1 al 9A.M? 
8 MR. K/\l\E: 
9 J believe it d()es. ves. At the- as far as f kno\V it does start at 9/\M. ves. 
,I , ~ 
10 vt. C.: ~ 
11 Ok. 
12 rv1R. KANE: 
~ 
13 YeHh. So. If you are planning on attending~ rd probably get there maybe about 8;30~ 8:45. You 
1.4 know, if you are planning on attending. That way, you can~ for you. 
15 M.C.: 
16 \VeJI basically I just \Vant to say what l have to say and then leave. You know. 
17 f\.;fR. KAKE: 
18 Ok. ·cause, it might- it might start directly at 9 o'clock, but ifs planned to. And so. 
19 M. C'.: 
20 Ok. 
21 rvlR. KANE: 
.7.7. Yeah. Ok, well thank you. and r do appreciate you calling me hack. 
23 fV1. C.: 
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1 Ok. No problem. 
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1 TRANSCRIBER'S CERTIFICATE 
2 
3 STATEOFUTAH ) 
4 ) ss. 
s COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
6 I, Aaron Crabtree, clerk for Larry Long, do hereby Certify: 
s That this transcription is an accurate representation of a telephone 
9 interview which took place between Shawn Kane, a private investigator, and M. C., the victim of 














WITNESS MY HAND this 26th day of March, 2015 
RABTREE, CLERK 
Residing in Salt Lake County 
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